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Targeted Export Promotion With
Several Oligopolistic Industries
ABSTRACT
In this paper we ask whether a policy of targeted export promotion
can raise domestic welfare when several oligopolistic industries all draw on
the same scarce factor of production. Our point of departure is one of
Cournot duopoly in which a single home firm competes with a single foreign
firm in a market outside the horse country. It has been shown previously
that when there is only one such industry in an otherwise perfectly
competitive world economy, a subsidy policy by the home government transfers
profits to the domestic firm, and thereby raises domestic welfare. However,
when many such industries (and only these) utilize the same inelastically
supplied resource, promotion of one bids up the return to the specific
factor, and consequently disadvantages all of the non—targeted industries in
their respective duopolistic competitions. Our question then is which
industry(s), if any, is worthy of promotion.
We find that, when the specific factor is used in fixed proportion
to output, and all of the duopolies have similar demand and cost conditions,
a policy of free trade is optimal. We identify the conditions for welfare
improvement when a single industry is selected for targeting under
asymmetric conditions, and also investigate whether a uniform subsidy to all
industries in the imperfectly competitive sector will raise domestic welfare.
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Subsidies that assist domestic firms in their competition with
foreign rivals are being viewed with increasing favor, both in
theoretical analyses and in practical applications. Conventional
economic reasoning regarded them as inappropriate instruments of trade
policy. Any terms-of-trade advantage would be pursued by restricting
trade through tariffs, not by promoting it using subsidies. A production
subsidy to an import-competing industry would be an inferior substitute
for a monopoly-optimum tariff, while such a subsidy to an exporting
industry would actually worsen the terms of trade.
The recent shift in the theoretical stance comes from a recognition
of the importance of oligopolistic competition in many industries. When
monopoly rents exist, a policy that transfers these rents from foreign
firms to domestic ones offers an element of national advantage. This is
seen most clearly in a case where the home market is not involved, so the
relevant contribution to home welfare is simply the home firms' profits.
Now consider a Cournot duopoly with a home firm and a foreign firm. A
subsidy to the home firm moves the equilibrium along the foreign firm's
reaction function towards the home firm's leadership point, i.e.
favorably to the home country. Spencer and Brander (1983) gave the first
clear example of such rent-extracting policies in the context of R&D.
Subsequent research has extended and modified this conclusion.
Dixit (1984) considers a somewhat more general Cournot oligopoly where
the home market is also involved, and possible trade-offs with consumer
surplus must be considered. He shows that the presumption for optimal
policy turns against subsidization as the number of domestic firms
increases. More fundamentally, Eaton and Grossman (1983) consider-2-
alternative forms of oligopolistic competition and show that policy
conclusions are very sensitive to the specification of the industry
equilibrium. In a Bertrand duopoly, for example, the rent-shifting
motive for policy intervention presumptively indicates a production or
export tax. With consistent conjectural variations, the transfer of
rents to the home firm is impossible, and free trade is optimal.
In this paper we shall focus on yet another difficulty with the
rent-extraction argument, which is of considerable practical importance
in the current context of U.S. trade policy. The models constructed so
far have considered one oligopolistic industry in an otherwise perfectly
competitive economy. When this industry is subsidized, it expands by
drawing resources from other uses where prices equal marginal costs, and
there are no rents to be lost. However, if several industries are
oligopolistic, we must consider the possibility that promoting
rent-extraction in one industry will at the same time cause an even
greater rent loss in another. The problem is especially serious if a
whole sector of such industries uses a specific factor, and all the
industries in the sector must compete with each other in bidding for the
services of this factor.
Consider the frequent arguments for promotion of the "high
technology' sector in the U.S. in the light of this. The sector actually
comprises many different industries. Most are at a stage of development
where world competition will remain oligopolistic for some time to come.
Almost all require significant quantities of scientifically skilled
labor, whose supply involves long lags in training and is therefore quite
inelastic over the time span where the market is oligopolistic. It is-3-
doubtful indeed that all these industries could expand simultaneously at
any given point in time.
In such a situation, the design of correct policies involves much
more subtle analysis. We must disaggregate to the industry level, and
devise principles that allow us to identify those that merit targeted
help. In doing so, we recognize the general equilibrium principle that
promotion of one industry is implicitly taxation of another. When
discrimination by industry is not possible, we have to ask whether a
uniform subsidy to the whole sector is worthwhile. Finally, we have to
consider the alternative forms of assistance, and determine which is
best.
In this paper we construct a simple model that allows us to answer
many of these questions. After describing the model and the first-best
allocation in Section 2, we consider in Section 3 the efficacy of
production or export subsidies targeted to specific industries. In
Section 4 we study a policy of uniform subsidization of the entire
imperfectly-competive sector. Finally, in Section 5 we note some caveats
and extensions of the analysis.
2. THE MODEL
As usual, we construct the simplest model that allows us to focus on
the issue of central concern, namely policy towards oligopolistic traders
who compete for a specific factor. We assume there are two factors of
production; for sake of concreteness we call them workers and scientists.
All outputs other than those of the oligopolistic high-technology
industries are aggregated into one good, which is assumed to be produced
by workers alone under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.We choose this good as numeraire, and measure it in units which make the
input-output coefficient equal to one. Then the workers' wage w will
equal 1 in equilibrium.
The high-technology sector consists of a number of industries,
labelled i =1,2,...n. One unit of good I is produced using one unit of
scientists' labor (choice of scales again) and a1 worker-hours. If z
denotes the scientists' wage, the marginal cost of production is
(a. +z).Factor markets are assumed to be competitive, therefore this
is regarded as constant by each individual firm. There may be fixed
costs which explain the oligopolistic market structure, but we do not
need to account for them explicitly. We will comment on the consequences
of relaxing the fixed-coefficient assumption in Section 5.
Consider the country active in export promotion policy, called the
home country. Let x be its output of the numeraire good, y. that of the
th high-technology industry, L the fixed supply of workers, and S that
of scientists. Then the factor market equilibrium conditions are
x +￿. a.y. =L (1) 11 1
:.y. =S (2) 11
Eachhigh-technology industry is an oligopoly involving domestic and
foreign firms. In conformity with the simplest model of rent-extraction,
we assume this to be a Cournot duopoly (i.e. one domestic firm and one
foreign firm per industry). Also, to avoid complications caused by the
consumer surplus in the home market, we assume that the home consumptionof the high-technology products is negligible. Discussion of the
consequences of relaxing these assumptions is postponed until Section 5.
Consider the 1th industry. Let Y. be the output of the foreign
firm, and r1(y.,Y.) the revenue function of the home firm. With no home
consumption, there is no difference between export subsidies and
production subsidies. Let s. be the subsidy per unit output of i. Then
the home firms first-order condition for profit-maximization is
r1(y., Y.) =a.+z-s. (3) 11 1 1 1
wherethe subscript 1 denotes partial differentiation with repect to the
first argument. The corresponding condition for the foreign firm can be
summarized in a "reaction" function'
Y. =B.(y.) (4)
Any policy variables of the foreign government are hidden as
parameters in the B., since we are not considering a strategic game of
policy. If we did, at its Nash equilibrium, the home country's optimum
choices would continue to be determined as in our analysis, where the B.
would then be interpreted to correspond to the equilibrium policy choices
of the foreign government.
Equations (2)—(4) can be solved for y., Y. for i =1,2,...n and for
z, and then x can be found from (1). A special case permits explicit
solution, and we will occasionally use it to illustrate some points of
detail. In it, the inverse demand functions are linear: for the home
firm (omitting the label i for ease of notation)-6-
p it -ty-KY
and for the foreign firm,
P =11-Ky
-TY.
We assume the products to be substitutes, i.e. K > 0. Demand theory
gives t, T positive, and (tT -K2)>0,with equality if the home and
foreign varieties are perfect substitutes. Then
r(y,Y)ny-ty2-KyY (3')
and
Y =B(y) (11 -C-Ky)/(2T) (4')
where C is the exogeneous and constant marginal cost of the foreign firm.
Returning to the general case, the criterion of social welfare in
the home country is simply the sum of factor incomes and profits, minus
the cost of subsidies:
W =L+zS÷ .{r1 -(a+z-s )y.,} -. s.y.
Using (1) -(4),this can be expressed in terms of output quantities:
W =x+. r1(y.,Bjy.)) (5)—7—
We are now ready to consider various issues involving choice of
subsidy policies. The general idea is that changes in the subsidy rates
s. will shift the home firms' "reaction' functions defined by (3), and
will move the oligopoly equilibria along the foreign firms' "reaction"
functions (4). For each i, there will be a most favorable choice ofy.,
namely the Stackelberg leadership point. But the scarcity of the
specific factor as reflected in (2) can prevent the simultaneous
attainment of these points for all i. The scientists' wage z will rise,
thereby producing a second and adverse effect on the home reaction
functions.
The necessary trade-offs will be judged at the most general level by
choosing x and the y. to maximize (5) subject to (1) and (2), or
substituting for x, maximize
W =L÷ jr1(y., B. (yj) -a.y. } (6)
subject to (2). Then we can find the s. that will sustain this optimum
from (3). This is the first-best, constrained only by resource
availability, technology, and the Cournot reactive behavior of the
foreign firm.
Let z denote the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (2), in view
of its economic significance. Then the first—order conditionsare, for
i =1,2,...n,
r1 +r1B—a.—z=0 (7) 1 2 1 1
Define-8-
r(y., B.(y.)) B(y.) (8)
With r <0and B <0as in usual Cournot duopoly, we have .>0.Then,
conparing (7) and (3), we see that the first-best can be sustained by
means of subsidies s. = .Thisis the standard rent extraction
1 1
argument.A marginal increase in the home firm's output has a twofold
effect on its revenues and profits. The first is the marginal revenue
r holding the foreign firm's output constant. But there is also a
profit-shifting effect, as the foreign firm moves down its "reaction"
function and the price of home output goes up. The home firm, given its
Cournot behavior, neglects the latter. If the government can calculate
it and implement a subsidy of that amount before the duopoly game is
played, the firm's calculation will reflect the full effect.
But the scarcity of the specific factor makes an important
difference. Although S.> 0for all i, this does not mean an increase in
all y. above their free trade levels. Inspection of (2)-(4) shows that
if all the s. are raised by one unit,thenew equilibrium has all the y1
unchanged, and z increased by one unit. Thus only differential subsidy
rates affect allocations. If a general subsidy is applied, the real
beneficiaries are the scientists whose wages rise. We do not think that
arguments for broad support for high-technology as a whole are motivated
by a desire to increase the rent to scarce scientific skills. But the
fact, and its possibly adverse distributional consequences, should be
borne in mind by policy-makers in practice.
In the linear example, we can calculate the output effects
explicitly. Let the superscript f denote free trade, and 0 the
first-best optimum. Then we can show that—9—
o f 0 f y. -y.=ô.[s.—(z-z)}
where
ô. 2T./(4t.T. -K) > 0
inthe notation of (3') and (4') with industry labels appended. But,




o f z -z=ó s/A mmm
where A ô .Substitutings. =4.in the first-best, we see that mm 1 1
> y if and only if4i. > mómm1'A
i.e. the profit-shifting effect of an output increase in industry i
exceeds the ô-weighted average of such effects for the whole sector. We
will come across sjmilar comparisons in other policy contexts in Section
3 and 4.
Next consider second-order conditions for the maximization of (6).
The constraint (2) being linear, a sufficient condition is that




For this, in turn, it is sufficient to have r'(y., Y.) concave (which
ensures that the bracketed expression is negative) and the foreign
reaction function convex (B".> 0). It is easy to verify that the
linear case poses no problems. But in general it is not possible to
assume that the second-order conditions will hold. If they fail, the
flrst-hest ontimwnwillinvole the identification ofoneindustry and -'-——----—--- — --- -———-
promotingitat the expense of all others. However, the informational
requirements of this are clearly formidable.
3. TARGETED SUBSIDIES
The first-best optimum choice of subsidies considered in the
previous section is usually remote from practial considerations of
policy. One reason is the political constraint on the government's
budget which finances the subsidy. Other reasons have to do with
information and computation. The welfare effects of small changes in
policy from the status quo can be computed using information about
demands and costs in the neighbourhood of the initial point. This is
more easily available and more reliable than the global information
needed to compute the first best. Finally, the political process may
admit policy changes only on an incremental basis, for fear of the
consequences of radical departures. These reasons motivate the "tax
reform" approach in the theory of public finance (e.g. Feldstein (1976)),
and we invoke them to justify attention to small changes in the subsidy
rates from an initial situation of free trade.-11--
When the subsidy rates (s.) change by (ds.), we differentiate (3)




dy..ô.(ds. -dz) 1 1 1
where
6.-1/(r1+ r2 B)
The Cournot stability condition on the relative slopes of the t'reaction'
functions gives 6. >0.This usage of 6. Is consistent with that defined
for the linear example in the previous section; Indeed, we see that the
local results above hold for large changes in the special case.
Now, differentiating (2), we have
o= dy= 6 ds -dz 6 m mm m m m m
or,
dz = 6 ds [A in m m
Then
dy. 6. {ds. -6ds /A}
1 1 1 rumm
In terms of partial derivatives,
az/as. =6./A>0 for all I (13)
1 1
and-12-
6.(1 -6./A)>0 for i j
ay. I —= ' (14) as.
J
6./A K 0 for i j
Inthe linear example, the 6. are constants, and then so are all these
derivatives.
Next we differentiate the expression (6) for welfare:
dW =k(rl+ r B -ak)dyk





=kk5kk -ZômdS/A} using (12)
=kk6k dsk -Xkk6k Xm 6mm'
Hence
aw/as.=6.{.-kk6k" (15)
We conclude from (15) that a small subsidy to the th industry will
increase welfare if
> m mômh'A (16)-13-
i.e. its profit-shifting effect exceeds the 6-weighted average of such
effects for the whole group of high-technology industries. If the
opposite inequality hold-s, a small tax on this industry is called for.
The explanation lies in the fact that the outputs of these
industries are together constrained by the availability of the
scientists' labor. Thus, in (14), the subsidy to industryraises its
output, but lowers the output of each of the other industries. The
positive profit-shifting effect of the former change must then be
compared to the negative effects of the latter changes. This is why the
industries with the strongest profit-shifting effects are to be
encouraged and those with the weakest ones discouraged. The exact
criterion is stated in (14). Since the 6. govern the strength of the
output responses, it makes sense to have them serve as the weights.
For notational simplicity, we took all the scientific-labor input
coefficients to be equal to one. If we had carried them along as general
symbols b., the comparison in (16) would set (4./b.) against its weighted
average. What really matters is the profit-shifting effect generated in
industry i per unit of additional scientific labor used there.
Needless to say, the correct calculation of the choices of
industries for targeted subsidies involves some subtle reasoning and
quite demanding information. The danger of errors in practical
implementation seems substantial.
In a symmetric case where all the 4.areequal (or when, in the
absence of any reliable discriminating information, the planner treats
them as equal), we have dW =0at the initial point. Thus free trade
satisfies the first-order conditions for optimality. The second-order
condition (9) again applies, now holding in common for all i. This can-14-
be verified for the linear example, but raises a potential problem in
general. With this proviso, we see that free trade is optimal for a
symmetric group of industries. When industries are indistinguishable as
candidates for targeting, and when all draw on a common, inelastically—
supplied resource, there is no benefit from selecting any one of them for
promotion (unless the profit-shifting effects are increasing in output,
in which case a single industry should be chosen for targeting).
4. UNIFORM SUBSIDY
In practice, we may be constrained to choosing a common rate of
subsidy for all industries in this sector. If they have different
profit-shifting effects, it is not clear that such a subsidy will be
beneficial. We investigate the issue now.
Such a common subsidy rate is more reasonable in ad valorem form,




dW/da =(a.+z)W/as. 11 1






—______ iiimmm - - ___ ___
Thebracketed expression is the 6-weighted covariance between the a. and
the 4).Inthis sense, if on the average the industries with large
profit-shifting effects are also relatively worker-intensive, then a
small subsidy to the sector as a whole will increase welfare. In the
more general form with b. as the input coefficients for scientific labor,
what is at stake is the correlation between (a/b )and(4)./b.). The 1 1 1 1
point is that a given ad valorem subsidy translates into a bigger subsidy
per unit of scientific labor if (a./b.) is bigger; this is a good policy
if (4)/b.) is correspondingly larger.
Away from the initial position of free trade, we can perform a
similar, but more tedious, calculation. A common ad-valorem subsidy rate
a has s. (a. + z)a, and a small change yields ds. =(a.+ z)da. We can
then compute dW/da, and find the a which sets it to zero. We have
a =Cov(a,4))/Var(a.) (18)
in the previously defined 6-weighted sense. Subject to the usual
second-order conditions, this yields the optimum uniform policy towards
the high-technology sector. The sign of a is that of the correlation
between a. and In the symmetric case, free trade is again optimal.4
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper we have argued that the rent-extraction argument for
export promotion must be severely qualified when the industries where
rent2extraction is possible compete for the services of a specific factor-16-
that is essential to production. In such circumstances, only those
industries with above—average rents in relation to their requirements of
this factor at the margin deserve promotion; those below the average
should be discouraged. If the industries are equal in this regard, or if
the information necessary to discriminate among them is lacking, free
trade is optimal.
In conclusion, we comment on the consequences of changing some of
the special assumptions of our model. That of fixed coefficients is the
most significant. If input substitution is allowed, the whole group of
industries can expand to some extent at the expense of the numeraire
good. This strengthens the argument for subsidies. To see this
explicitly, make the input coefficients functions a.(z), bjz) with a.




as. i'iz - y bt 1 mmm
where the initial point has free trade, and units have been chosen so
that all the b. equal one at that point. Since the b are all negative,
the denominator in (19) is larger than that in (15). Therefore subsidies
to some industries with below-average .maybe beneficial.
Our assumption of fixed marginal costs of production in the foreign
industries has allowed us to convey the intuition of our arguments in a
relatively simple framework. However, if the foreign country has an
interlinked production structure in the high technology sector that is
similar to that in the home country, then domestic subsidy policy could
induce a change in the return to foreign scientists, which would alter-17-
foreign marginal costs and thereby cause the foreign reaction schedules
to shift. The resulting second-round effects on domestic profits thus
far have been neglected in the analysis.
A benchmark case to consider is one in which all the home firms are
symmetric (i.e. have the same production and revenue functions), as are
all the foreign firms, though the home and foreign firm in a given
industry may differ from each other. Then we can show that, about the
free trade point, (or any other point at which the domestic firms receive
equal rate subsidies) a small change in the subsidy to any sector has no
effect on the equilibrium wage earned by foreign scientists. It follows
that for this case, our calculations in Section 3, which omit any change
in the foreign scientists wage extend immediately to the more general
specification. In particular, free trade at home remains optimal,
provided that the second—order sufficiency conditions are satisfied.
When the industries are not symmetric at home or abroad, incorporation of
the induced changes in foreign marginal costs in response to domestic
policy changes significantly complicates the calculations. For this
reason the information and computation requirements for welfare-
improving targeted promotion become all the more severe.
The effects of many other assumptions are not central to the issue,
Allowing home consumption will affect the desirability of policies that
change the final price. It will also require a greater refinement of
policy instruments, e.g. distinction between production and export
subsidies, and introduction of import tariffs. Considerations of several
firms, and non-Cournot conduct, will affect the rent-extraction
possibilities themselves. But all these points are fairly well known
from other work, and we do not expect to shed new light on them in-18-
connection with the issue of competition among a group of oligopolistic
industries.F000TNOTES
1. By writing (4) in this way, we implicitly are assuming that the high
technology sector in the rest of the world does not have the same
interlinked production structure as exists at home. This assumption
simplifies the exposition considerably without significantly
affecting the tenor of the conclusions, Alternatively, we could
specify a complete two-country general equilibrium structure in
which an inelastically-supplied specific factor constrains the
expansion of the foreign high technology sector in a manner similar
to that in the home country. Then the foreign reaction function
would be written as Y. =B.(y.,Z(Y1,Y2,. .. ,Y)),where Z is the
salary of foreign scientists. We postpone discussion of this case
until Section 5.
2.As in consumer theory, we really want W to be quasi-cacave in
(yl, y2,. .. ,y).Concavity of each r1 is clearly sufficient. Since
W is additiviely separable, it is also, "almost' necessary, see
Gorman (1976).
3. Incidentally, (11) shows that equal changes in subsidy rates to all
industries simply changes z by an equal amount with no effect on the
allocation. Thus the first-best in Section 2 could be sustained by
alternative policies with lower subsidy rates all around.
4.Note however, that subsidizing all of a group of symmetric
industries uniformly is equivalent to subsidizing none of them, so
that home welfare is flat over the range of uniform subsidy rates in
this case.-20-
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